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Different Counterparties in a Small Bank's FX Trading 
 
1. Introduction 
The microstructure research in foreign exchange is largely motivated by the 
failure of traditional exchange rate modeling (see e.g. Frankel and Rose, 1995; Tay-
lor, 1995; Faust, Rogers and Wright, 2003). In particular, the analysis of order flows 
has become a promising avenue of research, as aggregated flows seem to be re-
lated to exchange rates (Evans and Lyons, 2002, 2003). This recently uncovered fact 
about order flows is thus an additional motivation, beyond the goal of extending fi-
nance approaches to the FX market (Madhavan, 2000), to examine the decision-
making of FX dealers. Empirical work on dealers' behavior is scarce, however, as 
private information on the single transactions is necessary. We analyze a new data 
set of this kind, which is the first from a small bank and the first in comprehensively 
differentiating trading information between other dealers, commercial customers and 
the increasingly important financial customers. Our results reveal differences which 
seem to reflect informational levels and thus affect trading behavior and profits. 
Moreover, order flows from interbank and financial customer trades are informative 
even at the low frequency and limited order volume of a small bank, highlighting the 
explanatory power of the order flow approach in foreign exchange. 
The pioneering research in this field is Lyons (1995), who examined the trading 
behavior of a very large US dealer over one week in 1992. He established the exis-
tence of an inventory as well as an information effect in FX trading, in accordance 
with earlier findings for stock markets, such as Hasbrouck (1991), Madhavan and 
Smidt (1991) and Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993). The single dealer, however, is 
particular, as he trades only with other banks. Yao (1998) is thus the first study ana-
lyzing customer dealing separately from interbank dealing, finding smaller differ-
ences. Bjønnes and Rime (2001) introduce two facts into the literature: diversity in 
trading style found from their analysis of four dealers and the consideration of the 
new electronic brokerage systems. Separating traditional deals from electronically 
brokered deals reveals that the latter bring about a full disappearance of the inven-
tory and information effect in the form detected by Lyons (1995). Related effects can 
be found in a new form, however. Finally, Carpenter and Wang (2003) analyze differ-
ent participants' orders (as we do) with respect to their price impact on the dealer's   3
pricing, subsequent price changes and preferred trading channel. They find that the 
central bank has greatest impact, followed by non-bank financial institutions. Dealers 
with greater private information seem to prefer direct trading. These findings raise 
questions which are organized according to three typical determinants in the price 
equations of the microstructure literature, i.e. inventory, information and spread: 
First, can findings for the dealer’s inventory control mechanisms be confirmed 
for a small bank and for different counterparties? Second, is the dealers' information 
in relation to different counterparties the same or do the increasingly important finan-
cial customers in particular differ from the traditional commercial customers? Third, 
how do spreads behave towards the different counterparties and what can be in-
ferred about sources of profitability? These three research questions are addressed 
in this study. 
According to our knowledge, there are only the four above-mentioned data sets 
of Lyons (1995), Yao (1998), Bjønnes and Rime (2001) and Carpenter and Wang 
(2003) to analyze banks' deal-by-deal FX transactions. In comparison with these 
studies our data is unique in three respects: first, from a technical point of view, the 
data is quite recent, i.e. from the electronic brokerage environment of the year 2001, 
it spans the longest period so far, includes the relatively highest share of customer 
transactions and alone includes forward trades. Second, it covers a very different 
dealer, i.e. a participant whose FX trading volume is small in relation to the so far 
considered market makers – the small bank. Third, the data distinguishes three trad-
ing counterparties: we examine interbank versus customer business and we differen-
tiate for the first time in this literature comprehensively between commercial and fi-
nancial customers (Carpenter and Wang, 2003, disaggregate in the same way with 
their more recent data, including also the central bank). 
Our findings support the result of Bjønnes and Rime (2001), namely that the 
new electronic trading systems may have changed dealers' behavior in interbank 
trading in a way that contradicts results from  Lyons (1995) and Yao (1998). Inven-
tory control still exists, as can be recognized from the strong mean reversion in the 
trading position, but the mechanism works by using outgoing trades. In contrast to 
earlier studies, the information effect in our sample is masked by the many small 
trades with inverse sign, which reflects a simple cost effect. Regarding the informa-
tion level of counterparties, price setting slightly indicates better informed financial 
customers. The cumulative order flows support this supposition: only incoming inter-  4
bank flows and financial customer flows seem to carry information whereas commer-
cial customers behave like liquidity traders. Moreover, spreads seem to reflect these 
different levels of information too, as commercial customers pay more even after con-
trolling for size. Finally, we propose a calculus to decompose sources of profitability. 
It reveals that commercial customer business dominates profits, but that proprietary 
trading may also contribute. 
Overall, the results suggest that the size of a trading bank and in particular the 
kind of counterparty play a significant role. The small bank mostly acts as an inter-
mediary for its customers whereas much of the interbank business serves to clear 
customer orders. The bank treats other banks and tentative financial customers as 
informed counterparties. Finally, it seems to make some money from proprietary trad-
ing, whose sources cannot be identified in the customer business. Bringing findings 
to the macro level of exchange rate determination, incoming interbank and financial 
customer order flows are informative even at the low frequency and comparatively 
low volume that is characteristic of small banks. Thus, our disaggregated and high-
frequency data is consistent with the findings of Fan and Lyons (2003; see also Ly-
ons, 2001), namely that financial customers may be very important for understanding 
shorter-term exchange rate movements. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 develops three hypotheses based on 
a selective literature review, which are going to be tested later. Section 3 describes 
the data. Examination results are reported in Section 4 and Section 5 presents con-
clusions. 
 
2.  Literature and hypotheses 
The empirical literature on foreign exchange market microstructure received a 
most important impulse by Lyons' (1995) study on transaction determinants of a large 
US dealer in the spot DEM/USD market. This study was the first to show the impor-
tance of order flows for decision making in foreign exchange trading and thus the first 
to introduce a new category of "order flow information". Several studies have demon-
strated the usefulness of this concept: Ito, Lyons and Melvin (1998) or Covrig and 
Melvin (2001) use flows in an event study environment. Questionnaire surveys, such 
as Cheung and Chinn (2001) and Cheung, Chinn and Marsh (2000) revealed the im-
portance of flows for FX dealers. Gehrig and Menkhoff (2002) tested more detailed 
hypotheses on the character of flow information. Finally, recent work aims to apply   5
flow information to exchange rate explanations, e.g. Evans and Lyons (2002, 2003), 
Evans (2002), Killeen, Lyons and Moore (2001) or Froot and Ramadorai (2002), or 
uses order flow characteristics to explain the forecasting power of technical analysis 
(Osler, 2003). 
Whereas these kinds of studies show the power of "order flow information" in 
understanding foreign exchange markets, studies directly following Lyons' approach 
are comparatively rare (see Lyons, 2001, and Sarno and Taylor, 2001, for surveys on 
FX microstructure). Their focus is on grasping the dealers' decision-making, which 
requires a command of the relevant pieces of information. This information has, of 
course, proprietary nature and is thus difficult to get. Other studies on transaction 
data in foreign exchange have been based on indicative quotes (such as Peiers, 
1997; Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998; Danielsson and Payne, 2002; Dominguez, 
2003) or aggregated flows (Lyons and Evans, 2002). However, these kinds of data 
are not comprehensive enough – and thus not used – to analyze dealers' behavior in 
detail. For this purpose, one needs more information, for example, about the inven-
tory position of the dealer or about all sources of FX business. 
In this line of research, there are, to our best knowledge, the four earlier studies 
mentioned above, i.e. Lyons (1995), Yao (1998), Bjønnes and Rime (2001) and Car-
penter and Wang (2003)(related aspects based on the same data sets have been 
analyzed e.g. in Lyons 1998, Yao, 1998a, Bjønnes and Rime, 2001a). Their common 
theoretical background is the market microstructure literature – in particular Madha-
van and Smidt (1991) – postulating that pricing decisions will be influenced, among 
other things, by three interesting effects: first, an asset’s own inventory will influence 
price setting by promoting deals, leading to a mean-reversion of the inventory, in 
short the inventory effect.
1 Second, dealers acknowledge asymmetric information 
among market participants in the sense that they assume private information when 
they set prices for a larger potential deal. They protect themselves against this as-
sumed information disadvantage by setting larger spreads for larger orders; in short, 
the information effect. Finally, traders live from buying low and selling high, so that a 
spread is to be expected. The examination of the existence of these three effects is 
at the core of the earlier studies. We come to our research questions by reviewing 
respective literature results. 
                                                           
1 The inventory information is missing in Carpenter and Wang (2003).   6
Several important differences between the studies can be directly recognized 
from obvious design features. Starting with Lyons (1995) as the benchmark, he ana-
lyzes one very large US dealer in the DEM/USD spot market over one week. Yao 
(1998) also focuses on a large US dealer, but the coverage is over five weeks and 
this dealer is not only concerned with interbank trading but has a customer share of 
his trading volume of 13.9%. Bjønnes and Rime (2001) observe foreign exchange 
dealings at a Norwegian bank that is characterized as a major player in these mar-
kets. They analyze four dealers over one week of trading: dealer 1 mostly resembles 
Lyons' dealer, as he is the bank's main spot dealer in DEM/USD, although the vol-
ume is clearly smaller compared to Lyons' or Yao's market leaders. The Norwegian 
dealer is a "medium-sized market maker in DEM/USD". Dealer 3 is the "largest mar-
ket maker in NOK/DEM". Dealers 2 and 4, by contrast, command smaller volumes 
and are mainly active in the DEM/USD market. Carpenter and Wang (2003) analyze 
an Australian bank's external spot trading in AUD/USD and EUR/USD over 45 days. 
The customer volume share is about 10.6% and 4.6% respectively. More information 
on characteristics of the core DEM/USD (EUR/USD) dealers and their trading activity 
as well as market wide "benchmarking" information from the survey of the BIS (2002) 
is compiled in Table 1. Our own study is mentioned there for comparative purposes. 
Referring to the BIS turnover data in Table 1, it becomes obvious that previous 
studies on transaction data focus on extremely large dealers trading about 10 to 30 
times of the median dealer (see Annex 1 for a derivation of median size). Our bank, 
with a relevant volume of 39 mill. USD, is tiny by contrast but appears to be a good 
representation of a typical bank in this market. The same applies to the structure of 
counterparties. Whereas the dealers covered in other studies focus on a market 
maker's interbank trading, our bank has a customer share which is more normal 
when compared to the total market. Seen from this angle, our study – covered in Ta-
ble 1 for comparative purposes – thus provides hitherto missing evidence of a small 
bank, complementing earlier work. 
This difference between our sample and earlier studies thus compels the first 
research objective, i.e. to check robustness of earlier findings. In his seminal study, 
Lyons (1995) tests the explanatory power of several price determinants derived from 
the Madhavan and Smidt (1991) model of a market maker's behavior. He finds that 
price setting for incoming non-brokered interdealer trades, in the sense of a price 
change in relation to the earlier trade ∆pit, is indeed systematically influenced by   7
three determinants: first, there is an inventory effect as the dealer shows a clear 
mean reversion of his open position over time by "quote-shading", being caught by 
the terms Iit and Iit-1. If he has, for example, a large open long position in foreign cur-
rency, he sets prices more attractive to other buyers than to sellers in order to bal-
ance his portfolio. There is thus a larger probability of reducing the open position. 
Second, the dealer shows an information effect in the sense that he reacts carefully 
to large orders as he may suspect superior knowledge – private information – on the 
other market-side. The order volume is the term Qjt. Third, in order to earn a spread 
from his transaction, there is an asymmetry in price-setting as the price for purchases 
is slightly lower than for sales, i.e. the "direction" expressed by the terms Dt and Dt-1 
is important. Whereas this third determinant seems to be a necessary ingredient of 
trading, and is thus regularly found in empirical studies, the two other determinants – 
I and Q – are open to discussion. The baseline equation (1) is thus: 
 
∆pit = β0 + β1Qjt + β2Iit + β3Iit-1 + β4Dt + β5Dt-1 + εit     (1) 
 
Yao (1998) does not confirm the inventory effect for interbank trading. He ar-
gues that his dealer has a large customer business which provides him with an in-
formation advantage that the dealer does not want to signal unintentionally to others 
by quote shading. The existent inventory effect in customer trading (Yao, 1998, Table 
7) mirrors the discussion of the missing inventory effect in the interdealer market as 
quote shading does not play a significant role in the customer business. 
The Bjønnes and Rime (2001) study on interbank trading does not find an in-
ventory effect in interbank trading either. It provides convincing evidence that the 
changing market structure plays a role. In 1992, when Lyons' data was compiled, in-
terbank trading was mainly executed by direct interdealer communication and to a 
lesser extent by voice brokered trades, whereas nowadays electronic broker systems 
dominate. The latter systems, such as EBS and Reuters Dealing 2000-2 or its suc-
cessors, offer convenient ways for inventory control and are much more transparent 
than the former interbank market. Thus, we do not expect our small bank which ef-
fectively trades in the electronic brokerage world to behave as a Lyons' dealer would. 
However, the economic task of inventory control still exists and is addressed. 
The three earlier studies have unanimously shown that banks tightly control inventory 
in the sense that open positions in the respective currencies are restricted to certain   8
limits and may be reversed several times during a trading day. The microstructure 
literature on stock markets, which had been confronted with weak inventory effects 
too, suggests the existence of alternative ways of inventory control (e.g. Madhavan 
and Sofianos, 1997). Trading with other market participants, i.e. in particular outgoing 
trade, is an obvious means. It may be interesting to note that Madhavan (2000) ex-
plicitly mentions the (minor) use of this instrument in Lyons (1995) as a clear sign of 
its existence. It is Bjønnes and Rime (2001) who show that outgoing trades indeed 
serve as a systematic instrument to balance inventory. A small bank can be even 
more strongly expected to perform inventory control in the same way as a market 
maker. 
 
H1  Inventory control: Inventory control of a small bank in an electronic brokerage 
environment refers to all kinds of incoming trades and is mainly conducted via 
outgoing trades. 
 
A possibly even more interesting aspect in trading decisions than inventory con-
trol is the role of information. Lyons (1995) established an asymmetric information 
effect in interbank trading, just as in stock markets. This has been confirmed by Yao 
(1998) although not for customer business. Here, the coefficient of the information 
effect is rightly signed, but comes with a t-value of only 1.63. Yao argues that the in-
significance may be due to the fact that the full price impact of a large customer order 
develops over several periods. Bjønnes and Rime (2001) confirm the effect for direct 
interbank trades of their bank but do not find it in the electronic brokerage anymore. 
This difference may be no surprise, as the microstructure literature finds that in-
formed dealers prefer less transparent trading channels and would thus rather prefer 
direct to electronically brokered trades. That is indeed what Carpenter and Wang 
(2003) find in their study for the large interbank trades. This implies for our small 
bank that we do not expect an asymmetric information effect, neither for interbank 
nor for customer trades. 
However, the analyses of order flows have shown their relation with exchange 
rates, indicating an informative role of cumulative order flows for the whole market 
(Evans and Lyons, 2002, Rime, 2001) or for a large bank (Fan and Lyons, 2003). 
Does the order flow at a small bank reveal any information, too? Will even the find-
ings for disaggregated flows by Lyons (2001) and Fan and Lyons (2003) – showing   9
that financial customer orders are highly correlated with shorter-term exchange rate 
movements – show up again? Both mentioned studies use the data of a large bank 
which is aggregated per day for all the trading of three differentiated customer groups 
each. This flow information is thus still much more representative and thus more ro-
bust than our transaction data at a small bank. If there is any effect, it could show up 
in the incoming interbank trades, reflecting order flows of large participants but, 
again, the comparatively small customer base does not promise too much. 
 
H2  Information effects: There is no asymmetric information effect expected in the 
small bank's trading. Cumulative incoming interdealer trades may carry private 
information but the customer business of a small bank does not. 
 
The third microstructure element being examined here is the spread as a basis 
for understanding sources of profits from FX trading. For a small bank, we would ex-
pect that profits are even more clearly based in the customer business than for po-
tentially better informed large market making banks. As the profit share from proprie-
tary trading is estimated to be about only 15 per cent in Lyons (1998), the expecta-
tion for the small bank may tend towards zero. Regarding the differentiation of cus-
tomer groups, which is possible from the data here, one might plausibly assume that 
better informed counterparties are less profitable for the bank. 
 
H3  Spreads and profitability: The bank does not make money from proprietary trad-
ing. Regarding counterparties, the least informed counterparties – possibly 
commercial customers – may be most profitable. 
 
In summary, the new data allows us to test the three hypotheses as described 
above. Regarding hypothesis 1 on inventory control, the idea is to confirm the exis-
tence of other instruments than quote shading. Regarding hypothesis 2 on informa-
tion effects, we do not expect to find asymmetric information in the new environment. 
Due to the small size of the bank, any information from cumulative order flows seems 
to be highly questionable ex ante. Finally, possible differences in spreads may trans-
late into the heterogeneous profitability of counterparties in trading. The data to test 
these hypotheses is described in the next section. 
   10
3. Data 
The data set employed in this study consists of the complete USD/EUR trading 
record of a bank in Germany. The record covers 87 trading days, beginning on 
Wednesday, the 11
th of July 2001, and ending on Friday, the 9
th of November 2001.
2 
Compared with the other microstructure data sets mentioned, this is the longest 
observation period to date. Due to the size of the bank as a marginal market making 
participant with a limited customer base, the transaction frequency is comparatively 
low. The bank realizes about 40-50 USD/EUR trades per day, including all kinds of 
transactions, whereas the big market makers covered earlier perform about five 
times as many transactions per day. The data set includes transaction prices, quanti-
ties, information about the initiator of each trade and a time stamp. The information 
on the bank’s inventory position can be designed by cumulating the successive 
transactions. These kinds of calculations are performed for the bank and not for a 
single dealer. However, due to the comparatively small size of our institution, there is 
only one dealer responsible for the bank's USD/EUR inventory position and trading 
policy – although he may be supported by other dealers when required – so that 
there is no de facto difference to earlier studies covering dealers. 
In order to obtain a broad data set, we include outright-forward trades in an ad-
justed manner, i.e. by correcting for the forward points. In our opinion, these trades 
should not be disregarded, as we especially focus on customer trading, and outright-
forward trades account for a large portion of customer business. Moreover, outright-
forward trades influence the inventory position in "our" small bank, as this trading is 
also conducted by, and accounted for, the same dealer as the spot trading. However, 
to make our findings more comparable to the literature, we have also performed the 
examinations without these outright-forward trades. Results mostly do not differ from 
each other and are thus not reported, although statistical measures tend to be better 
when more data is considered. 
 
3.1 Deals  blotter 
The FX dealings of the bank are split into two segments: (i) trading with other 
dealers takes place on the "trading floor", and (ii) customer trades are transacted by 
the "sales staff". While dealers on the trading floor can choose between different trad-
ing channels, the sales staff generally communicates by telephone with the custom-
                                                           
2 We could not find any enduring change in trading behavior due to a possible "September-11
th-effect".   11
ers and their colleagues from the trading floor respectively. Each member of the 
sales staff is responsible for a certain group of customers, e.g. financial institutions or 
commercial customers. The dealers are notified of customers’ requests by the sales 
staff via voice-box or phone. Because they are not informed about the direction of the 
upcoming trade (buy or sell), they always place bid/offer quotes at market conditions. 
Figure 1 illustrates the communication structure and the process of FX trading. Deal-
ers told us that they almost solely use the electronic brokerage system EBS, because 
communication and transactions require less time than in any other interdealer trad-
ing channel. Moreover, spreads are very advantageous – around one or two pips 
only. 
The data set consists of all trades, including indirect trades executed by voice-
brokers or electronic brokerage systems such as EBS, direct trades completed by 
telephone or electronically, internal trades and customer trades. All trades are en-
tered manually into the "deals blotter" by the back-office without differentiating be-
tween the several trading channels of each transaction. Bid-offer quotes at the time 
of each transaction are not recorded, either, but we can easily identify bid-offer prices 
afterwards by means of the trade-initiating party. For each trade, the following infor-
mation is obtained from the hardcopy record: 
(1)  the type of each trade; 
(2)  the date and time of the trade
3; 
(3) the  counterparty; 
(4)  the quantity traded; 
(5) the  transaction  price; 
(6)  the forward points if applicable
4; 
(7)  the initiator of the trade. 
Identifying the initiator of each trade allows for distinguishing between incoming 
(passive) and outgoing (active) trades. Similar to the finding by Yao (1998, Table 3b), 
approximately 53% of all trades are signed as incoming or passive. 
 
 
                                                           
3 The time stamp indicates the time of data entry and not the moment of trade execution which will 
differ slightly. Nevertheless there is no allocation problem because all trades are entered in a strict 
chronological order. 
4 On the basis of the forward points it is possible to transform each outright-forward trade into a "spot-
like" trade. This requires that the covered interest parity holds, which is a stylized fact for the market 
under consideration.   12
3.2 Inventory  position 
The bank performs a clearly risk-averse policy regarding its open USD/EUR in-
ventory position. The maximum long position is EUR 73.1 million, and the maximum 
short position is EUR 49.1 million. These extreme values are misleading, however, 
as the average absolute open position during the day is just EUR 3.4 million. The day 
always ends with a position close to zero. As we have no information about a possi-
ble overnight position change, we follow Lyons (1995) and set the daily starting posi-
tion to zero. Figure 2 presents this inventory position measured in EUR. 
The findings on our bank's inventory policy is consistent with Lyons (1995), Yao 
(1998) and Bjønnes and Rime (2001). Also, the absolute size of the inventory does 
not differ significantly from those observed in the three former studies, which is note-
worthy, as our bank trades less often and with less volume. Obviously, the balancing 
of the inventory position is an important feature of dealers’ behavior regardless of the 
bank’s size. 
 
3.3  Types of trade 
Table 2 presents some statistics about the different types of trade. The structure 
of the interdealer trades is very similar to the ones observed by Bjønnes and Rime 
(2001, Table 2). Mean, median and standard deviation indicate that most transac-
tions are in fact executed via EBS, as the dealers told us.
5 
Of more interest are the customer trades. The share of customer trading vol-
ume, amounting to nearly 40% (23% spot trades only), is striking. Moreover, our data 
set allows us to distinguish between three different groups of customers according to 
the bank's classification: financial business, commercial business and preferred 
commercial business. Whereas preferred and commercial customers mostly trade 
small positions in foreign exchange, financial customers transact larger amounts. The 
latter, however, trade less often with our bank than commercial customers. Outright-
forward trades seem to play a major role in customer business where they make up 
for 30 to 40% of all trades. Despite their numerical importance, they do not have an 
effect on the statistical structure of the data set (see Panel A and B in Table 2). The 
                                                           
5 When working with the EBS system dealers can only transact trades of the size of one, two or five 
million EUR/USD. Trades of the size of 10 million EUR/USD are pretty uncommon. There is only one 
single trade above that.   13
share of outright-forward trades does not differ significantly between the three cus-
tomer groups, either. 
 
3.4  Descriptive statistics of regression variables 
Descriptive statistics for the relevant variables used in the estimations and inter-
transaction times are reported in Table 3. According to the above reasoning we will 
include outright forward transactions when it comes to the regression analysis. We 
will neglect, however, the preferred commercial business in the following, as these 
customers are attended to individually, each with specific conditions, possibly reflect-
ing cross-selling arrangements. Moreover, some cases are deleted from the final 
data set due to extreme price changes of more than 100 basis points or tiny volumes 
of less than 1,000 USD, as both characteristics may overly influence the relations of 
interest. 
The final data set is thus composed of all incoming and outgoing spot and out-
right-forward trades of the interdealer, the financial and the commercial customer 
business (see Table 3). When reproducing Lyons’ (1995) baseline model, we also 
consider only incoming trades. It might be interesting to compare the absolute values 
of these variables with the ones of the former studies. 
One thing that catches the eye is the absolute change in transaction price be-
tween two periods Abs(∆pit). Mean, median and standard deviation are by far higher 
– though not beyond means – than in the other studies mentioned. This can be ex-
plained by the fact that the trading records contain transactions of very different 
counterparties and by the comparatively long intertransaction time ∆t. Whereas the 
average intertransaction time in Lyons (1995) and Yao (1998) is only 1 minute and 
46 seconds, and in Bjønnes and Rime (2001) approximately 5 minutes, almost 13 
minutes pass between two trades in our study and as long as 25 minutes between 
two incoming trades. In the foreign exchange business this is a huge time gap. The 
question arises whether the regression equation of Lyons’ baseline model, which 
tries to map the dealer’s reaction, is still an appropriate way of modeling this kind of 
trading behavior, as a lot can happen within 25 minutes! We help ourselves by trim-
ming the data set to transactions and price changes of up to five minutes only and we   14
use this "adjusted" data set for confirmatory estimations.
6 Although we lose a lot of 
observations, explanatory power sometimes tends to increase. 
The statistics of the absolute values of order flow Abs(Qjt) and inventory Abs(Iit) 
are very similar to those observed in Bjønnes and Rime (2001, Table 4, dealer 1), but 
clearly smaller than in Lyons (1995, Table 2) or Yao (1998, Table 4), which is com-
patible with the differences in  the dealers’ sizes. 
 
4. Results 
This section presents results in the order of the three hypotheses derived 
above. Within each section the different counterparties in foreign exchange trading 
are addressed. Section 4.1 focuses on inventory control, Section 4.2 examines in-
formation effects and Section 4.3 concentrates on spreads as a basis for profits. In 
order to check the robustness of findings all analyses discussed below have been 
repeated for spot trades only, for subsamples with different intertransaction times, for 
subperiods and with OLS regressions where appropriate. These changes do not sys-
tematically influence results and are thus usually not reported here. 
The examination of microstructure effects in foreign exchange interdealer trad-
ing was pioneered by Lyons (1995). However, the changing trading environment and 
to some degree the different positioning of traders makes the earlier findings seem 
too specific (i.e. not general enough), as Bjønnes and Rime (2001) show. For the 
purpose of comparison, we have nevertheless repeated Lyons' regressions but do 
not find surprising effects. What can still be recognized is a clear "bounce" effect 
seen in the significant direction variables, but neither an inventory nor an information 
effect – just as expected (see Table 4).
7 
 
 4.1  Inventory  control 
The picture becomes very different when we turn to confirm the fact of inventory 
control and to identify another instrument for inventory control. One approach to test 
inventory control is to regress the inventory position in t-1 on the change in inventory 
                                                           
6 We also cut down the data set after a 10, a 15 and a 20 minutes interval. The results do not differ 
significantly. As a tendency one can recognize that the smaller the time interval, the better the fit of 
the model. 
7 In order to better identify the unexpected component of order flow, Romeu (2003) suggests a modifi-
cation which we have applied and which indeed brings about a correctly signed and statistically sig-
nificant order flow term, indicating an asymmetric information effect. In our regression, however, the 
inventory terms now become "wrongly" and significantly signed. So, we do not follow this approach 
in our case.   15
from t-1 to period t. The coefficient of interest would be zero if inventory changed 
randomly. If there were inventory control, however, the expected mean reversion in 
inventory would be revealed by a negatively signed coefficient. Table 5 gives a "cor-
rectly" signed and statistically significant coefficient showing that inventories tend to 
be reduced in the next trade by 21%. The size of this coefficient indicates a higher 
risk aversion in holding inventories than for the market maker examined by Bjønnes 
and Rime (2001) with a parameter size of 11%. However, the holding period is 
longer, so both effects tend to compensate each other. 
If we apply this approach to measure an inventory effect for different counter-
parties, we do find that inventories are basically adjusted in the same way as when 
considering interbank business alone. It may be interesting to note, however, that 
financial customer orders are most cautiously treated in the sense that the mean re-
version term is the comparatively highest. 
The supposed instrument to perform inventory control is outgoing trades. We 
provide two approaches supporting the role of this instrument. Table 6 shows that for 
a regression approach proposed by Bjønnes and Rime (2001), the choice for an out-
going trade is independent of the inventory size (Abs Iit-1), negatively related to the 
trade size (Abs Qjt) but positively determined by the fact that a customer trade was 
foregoing. 
Another test of the particular role of outgoing interbank trades can be conducted 
by regressing cumulative customer order flow on different forms of cumulative inter-
bank flows. If customer trades would indeed be squared by outgoing interbank trades 
– and not by appropriate positioning of limit orders – the exclusive relation should be-
come obvious. The cointegration test shown in Table 7 and the graphical presenta-
tion of the relation in Figure 3 clearly supports the importance of outgoing interbank 
trades as an instrument of inventory control. 
 
 4.2  Information  effects 
Regarding the examination of information effects in FX trading, we examine 
three possible effects: first, the traditional asymmetric information assumption, sec-
ond, counterparty-dependent information levels, and, third, the information content of 
disaggregated cumulative order flows. 
Regarding asymmetric information in interbank trading, we have learnt that 
dealers do not regard this as a core issue anymore, as the electronic brokerage sys-  16
tem provides sufficient liquidity to square less welcomed incoming trades, too. The 
empirical examination in Table 4 above is largely consistent with this view. 
In another attempt to find out a possible asymmetric information effect, Bjønnes 
and Rime (2001) suggest to re-estimate the Madhavan and Smidt equation without 
the insignificant inventory terms. Calculations with our data show that the size of an 
incoming trade can then become a significant determinant of the bank's pricing be-
havior. Table 8, Panel A gives a statistically significant but surprisingly signed coeffi-
cient for the overall sample as the coefficient is negative, indicating that larger cus-
tomer orders receive better prices. The explanation is straightforward, however: in 
contrast to earlier studies, our small bank is characterized by many small-sized cus-
tomer orders below one million USD that were unimportant in other studies. These 
small orders are handicapped by two effects. First, banks have to cover fixed admin-
istrative costs for each deal and, second, small orders are more often given by small 
customers who can be expected to be less informed. 
We thus run the same exercise for the different counterparties and find that the 
comparatively small commercial customers are indeed the driving force whereas nei-
ther financial customers nor interbank trading generate a significant negative coeffi-
cient (not reported here). The importance of size also becomes obvious from a re-
gression considering only deals of one million USD and more which lead to an insig-
nificant coefficient (not reported here). It is interesting, however, that a sample con-
sidering only incoming interbank trades results in a positive coefficient that is signifi-
cant (Table 8, Panel B). Even though significance is fragile, the positive sign seems 
to be robust and indicates the problematic informative position of a small bank in the 
interbank market where the large market makers may be regarded as better in-
formed. 
We further explore this indication of counterparty-dependent levels of informa-
tion by running the same type of regression as in Table 8 Panel A but including 
dummies for the three different counterparties (see Table 9). The significantly nega-
tive size effect is found again. New is, however, that the change in price is signifi-
cantly lower for interbank trades and higher for commercial customer trades when 
compared to others. As there is some control for size, the counterparty effects – lead-
ing to differentiated prices – may cautiously indicate respective levels of information: 
other dealing banks, i.e. mainly big market makers, are comparatively best informed,   17
followed by financial customers and, lastly, commercial customers. We dig deeper 
into this field in Section 4.3. 
Finally, possible information in cumulative trades is examined. Evans and Lyons 
(2002) found that the cumulative order flow in the market is positively related to the 
exchange rate movement on the basis of daily aggregation. Fan and Lyons (2003) 
confirmed this kind of relation even for customer groups of a large market maker, 
again, for daily aggregated data. We test the same kind of idea but use deal-by-deal 
data for the different counterparties. As formulated in Hypothesis 2, a translation of 
findings from market wide data to a small bank does not seem to be very realistic. 
Many idiosyncratic shocks have to be expected, which might distort any relation. 
Findings for our data are given as cointegration tests documented in Table 10 and as 
graphical presentation in Figure 4 (see also Bjønnes and Rime, 2001). 
It can be seen that two kinds of flows may contain information, i.e. incoming in-
terbank trades and financial customer orders. Regarding the interbank market, the 
distinction between incoming and outgoing deals is necessary because outgoing 
trades largely serve as an instrument to balance inventory. They may thus be infor-
mative to other banks, but information about the market can only be gained from in-
coming trades. Less clear-cut is the case for the two customer groups. Even though 
the Fan and Lyons (2003) finding might suggest the informative content in financial 
customer orders, the sample of a small bank is really tiny when compared to the 
market and the findings thus rather surprising. 
Reflecting these information effects, they may seem trivial from a demand and 
supply perspective but are a challenge for an asset market view. Traditional macro-
models of foreign exchange markets consider fundamentals, possibly a risk premium 
and assume that any news is instantaneously incorporated into prices. Information 
contained in order flows may thus be seen as a vehicle of time-consuming informa-
tion flows, either about news or risk perceptions. The case of the order flow view of 
foreign exchange is thus not self-evident and needs empirical support. Our data fits 
into the new literature but is remarkable in the respect that it stems from a small 
bank. A smaller bank, by definition, does not receive as many and as large flows as a 
market maker. That a small bank can recognize anything at all from incoming orders 
indicates that orders are widely and quickly disseminated in the market. The foreign 
exchange market is in this sense an efficient means of distributing "information" and 
the order flow view gains support from our study.   18
  4.3  Spreads and profits 
The last element to be examined is the spread component. It seems ex ante 
logical that a positive spread should be in the data, as banks do not charge fees to 
their counterparties in foreign exchange. Banks have to cover their administrative 
and capital costs and aim for earning a risk premium. It is thus comforting to note that 
a positive spread is a very consistent and robust finding in all kinds of specifications. 
For example, it can be found in the above presented "baseline estimation" (see Table 
4), even though other aspects of this approach seem to be dependent on the type of 
trader and the trading environment. In the following, we proceed in four steps: first, 
we document the very clear size dependent price effect. Second, after controlling for 
size, different spreads are still observable. Third, profits are statistically explained by 
customer business and other variables. Fourth, estimating the impact from proprie-
tary trading, profit sources are calculated from different angles. At the beginning, 
there is the objective to better understand the determination of spreads, as this is the 
basis of understanding the sources of profits. 
Spreads do quite clearly depend on the size of the transaction, in particular 
when the sizes differ as much as in our sample. Figure 5 provides a plot of the abso-
lute volume of a trade and the absolute price change. Considering that price changes 
vary significantly due to various unsystematic shocks, it is only the "average" that in-
forms about the systematic volume dependent component. A regression where we 
take the log of the absolute size, plus the absolute size of transactions as explana-
tory variables, generates the regression line given in Figure 5. The fit of this ap-
proach is not very good, even though it is better than that of many other approaches 
we have tried.
8 Due to the low explanatory power, a disaggregation of this approach 
considering different counterparties does not help much either (not reported here). 
We thus follow a different path and extend the reduced baseline equation as 
used in Section 4.2 by considering different spreads for the three counterparties be-
ing differentiated. Table 11 shows that coefficients have the expected signs and are 
indeed statistically significant. Moreover, the extension increases interpretive reliabil-
ity. Assessing the spreads for different counterparties, we find very different sizes of 
spreads and an ordering that resembles an earlier finding from Section 4.2, where we 
had applied counterparty dummies. Table 11 reveals that the spread in interbank 
                                                           
8 The rationale for this specification is to grasp two effects, i.e. the cost effect dominating small orders 
and the weak asymmetric information effect for very large orders.   19
trading is small and in this specification even not significantly different from zero (see 
also Carpenter and Wang, 2003, Table 4, electronic brokerage). Financial customers 
get a higher spread but it is commercial customers that clearly pay most (although 
this does not say anything about the competitiveness of the pricing). We interpret 
findings up to this point as a sign of group-specific spreads, even being different 
when taking into account the different trade sizes. This may cautiously indicate that 
groups with highest spreads are most important for profitability. 
The crucial question for any profitability calculation is whether the bank only 
makes profit from customer trading or whether it earns from its own proprietary trad-
ing as well. The supposition from the scarce literature is quite clear: customer trad-
ing, or more generally, the income from spreads, seems to be the dominant profit 
base (Lyons, 1998, Yao, 1998a). In our case one may speculate that the small bank 
predominantly acts as intermediary and much less as a market maker. One may 
even question whether it can successfully participate in the interbank market due to 
its small size and the correspondingly small flows. 
The suggested methods to investigate profitability of proprietary trading cannot 
be reproduced here. Lyons (1998) uses the information from non-dealt quotes to infer 
about speculative position-taking and thus proprietary trading. Yao (1998a) makes 
reasonable assumptions about interbank trades that follow incoming order flow with 
the aim of closing unwanted positions – the remaining position is then of a rather 
speculative nature. Unfortunately, we neither have information on quotes nor a stable 
pattern following incoming trades. Nevertheless, we generate almost perfect informa-
tion about actual income per day, have information about relative spreads of coun-
terparties and roughly know fixed total costs per trade – this frame ensures that cal-
culations about income and profits should be useful. Moreover there is the methodo-
logical advantage – due to the comparatively long period covered here – that regres-
sions can be run on daily income data. 
According to the data used in this study, one can calculate the total income by 
subtracting value-weighted total purchases from total sales. In addition, we assume 
the average income margin resulting from this calculation applies to the open position 
at the end of the day – this yields an income of approximately 966 thousand Euros. 
Inflating this figure to a full year makes roughly 3 mill. EUR income from spot and 
forward USD trading. Further sources of income for the total FX department come 
from swap trades, future and option trades and from trading in other currencies. In   20
comparison to this "hard" income figure, profit figures are more questionable. We ba-
sically assume for our calculations that there are fixed administrative costs per trade 
of 100 EUR. Reliable information on this issue is difficult to get and not easy to inter-
pret, as it would require insight into the internal cost accounting of a bank. We just 
take this figure – which may be a rough guess of full transaction costs – and later 
provide some robustness considerations. 
Income determinants cannot be calculated exactly, as this would require infor-
mation on alternative market prices simultaneously – the true spread would then be 
the difference between the price realized with the counterparty and the market price. 
This information is not included in our data and cannot be constructed from available 
sources. We have to rely on approximations based on different available data. 
Spread income from trading is plausibly estimated by trading volume and can be di-
vided into groups of counterparties. The difficult analytical problem is proprietary trad-
ing: even though the bank is tentatively closing open positions that have been re-
ceived due to incoming order flow, the bank usually does not directly and fully close 
open positions during the day. A proxy for this kind of position-taking is the daily av-
erage of absolute values of inventory from trade to trade. Again, in a frictionless mar-
ket, a non-speculative approach would result in a zero inventory, even though cus-
tomer orders are intermediated. Other proxies for possible gains from proprietary 
trading are volatility in the market or possible trends over the day. 
Putting these variables into univariate regressions explaining income for 87 
trading days shows that volume and inventory have clear explanatory power, but that 
the other variables, such as price trend and price volatility, do not (not reported here). 
Testing several multivariate regressions always leads to a similar finding: volume and 
inventory are significant. Of course, both have a common component. The resulting 
regression in Table 12 thus considers the volume of three counterparties as well as 
the inventory component going beyond volumes. Standardized coefficients for this 
approach give a rough picture about the relative importance of these variables for 
income. Commercial customers are first in this respect, proprietary trading second 
and financial customers third, whereas a positive income effect from interbank trad-
ing is questionable. 
As an alternative way of investigating the possible impact of proprietary trading 
on income, the structure of spreads over time is informative. We thus follow the re-
duced baseline equation approach from Table 8 and calculate the change in spread   21
depending on the intertransaction time. As can be seen from Table 13, there is a 
recognizable trend that spreads become larger over time (the level of "spreads" is not 
of interest here but rather its time structure). As the estimation includes the direction 
of the trade, the finding does not just reflect increasing volatility with lower data fre-
quency. If we assume that trades within one-minute intervals come closest to the no-
tion of frictionless intermediation, the time-dimension of increasing spreads indicates 
profitable decisions to hold positions. Then the difference between shortest-term 
trades and long-term trades serves as a proxy for proprietary trading. It follows from 
this procedure that the "share" of proprietary trading to overall income would be in the 
order of up to 18% (for overall spread vs. 1 minute spread). Less clear is the origin of 
this income: we cannot identify any trading strategy that would systematically react 
on customer orders (not reported here). 
Translating 18% into Euros means that the bank generated an income of about 
174 thousand Euros with proprietary trading during the sample period. The remaining 
792 thousand Euros are distributed according to the structure of spreads with coun-
terparties (see Table 11) times their respective volumes. Table 14 Panel A gives the 
results. Not surprisingly, commercial customers generate most income according to 
this calculation. More interesting – but unfortunately also quite debatable – is the next 
step from income to profits. 
As a first assumption, we set administrative costs to be fixed costs per trade of 
100 Euros and we neglect other kinds of costs. As a second assumption, we allocate 
interbank trading to the three other groups by conducting two things: commercial cus-
tomer trades are followed by interbank trades in 34% of cases, financial customer 
trades in 64%. The costs of these interbank trades are allocated to the respective 
customer trades. All remaining interbank trades, i.e. 1,269 trades, are assumed to be 
caused by proprietary trading. As a third assumption, the small amount of interbank 
income is allocated according to the just described trading shares. These calcula-
tions result into a "profit" that is about 612 thousand Euros, of which more than 80% 
is generated by commercial customers, 10% by proprietary trading and less than 
10% by financial customers (see Panel B in Table 14). 
Of course, the assumptions that we have made explicit can be debated. In par-
ticular, three questions arise: first, is the rough estimation of an 18% income share 
from proprietary trading justified? Second, is the fixed cost of 100 Euros possibly too 
low, and, third, is the interbank trading correctly allocated? Regarding the 18% share,   22
the argument is not that it is exactly this value, but also the regression approach (see 
Table 12) shows that proprietary probably generates income. Regarding fixed costs, 
higher figures would in particular reduce the profit share of the small-sized commer-
cial customers. A different allocation of interbank trading might, for example, argue 
that the participation of the small bank is not only necessary to conduct own account 
trading but also to attract larger customers. This might justify a redistribution of costs 
from proprietary trading to customer trading with respective consequences for profit-
ability. 
In summary, there is evidence that commercial customers of this small bank 
pay higher spreads due to smaller volumes per trade – covering fixed costs – and 
due to less information – reflecting their avoidance of costs for information acquisi-
tion. The opposite end of the spectrum of counterparties is marked by banks in the 
interdealer market where the small bank hardly generates income and does not 
seem to be too well informed. Financial customers are in between, but clearly come 
closer to the interbank market than to commercial customers. Profitability calculations 
reflect relative information levels: the bank mainly relies on trading income from 
commercial customers. There are indications of income from proprietary trading but 
its source can neither be related to an information advantage in the interbank market 
nor to private information from customer orders. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This study examines all of the single transactions of a bank in Germany in 
USD/EUR-trading over a four-month period. The purpose is to learn about the behav-
ior of this bank and about possible differences of the counterparties in the trading 
process. We complement and extend the rare earlier literature in three respects: first, 
we examine inventory effects for three different counterparties in the new environ-
ment of electronic brokerage. Evidence supports hypothesis 1, confirming the find-
ings of Bjønnes and Rime (2001), namely that inventory control is important and that 
its main instrument is outgoing trades. Second, we apply several approaches to test 
information effects. In contrast to earlier literature, asymmetric information effects are 
rather small; trade size does matter but inversely to findings in earlier studies, i.e. 
trade size is related to decreasing price changes, as the small bank conducts small 
trades. What is surprising from our point of view is, however, that cumulative order 
flows of incoming interbank and financial customer trades are informative even at the   23
low business frequency and low trading volume of a small bank. In summary, there is 
much more information identified even at the small bank than was expected ex ante. 
Thus, hypothesis 2 is not really supported. Thirdly, spreads are found to reflect not 
only different amounts of trades but also differences in information level. These dif-
ferences can be shown to tentatively translate into profits for our bank, thereby back-
ing hypothesis 3. Moreover, we find, without explanation, that the small bank gener-
ates profits in proprietary trading. Our expectation in this respect was more skeptical 
– so hypothesis 3 is not supported. 
Overall, the order flow approach to foreign exchange as pioneered by Lyons 
(1995) proves to be a fruitful avenue (see early Goodhart, 1988). It is comforting that 
the advances made by Bjønnes and Rime (2001) hold at a different time and for a 
different type of bank, too. It is encouraging, moreover, that the findings for the inter-
bank business can for the most part be extended to customer business (see earlier 
Yao 1998). Finally, the microstructure approach's supposition that heterogeneity mat-
ters is confirmed by the different roles played by the different counterparties. The key 
towards understanding the behavior of the small bank towards these counterparties 
seems to be the relative information level of each group. Other market makers may 
be even better informed than the small bank, financial customers are treated cau-
tiously and only commercial customers are clearly less informed. It fits into this inter-
pretation that the last group may be the main source of profitability. 
In particular, the findings on the differences in customer groups impel us to 
speculate on possible links with the macro exchange rate literature. Our results 
strengthen the hypothesis that the theoretically and empirically hardly explainable 
shorter-term exchange rate movements are connected to the behavior of financial 
customers, such as fund managers. Moreover, the analysis of order flows may pro-
vide a useful approach to studying the behavior of this group in particular and thus to 
learning about the true dynamic forces in the foreign exchange market. As these re-
sults point in the same direction as the study of Fan and Lyons (2003), although ap-
plying more disaggregated data of a different kind of bank, further research along 
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Plot shows the evolution of the dealer’s inventory position in EUR millions over the whole sample pe-
riod (07/11/01 – 11/09/01). The horizontal axis is in transaction-time. Vertical lines indicate the end of 
each calendar week.  
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Table 2  Types of trades 
A    Spot and outright forward trades 





business  Total 
No. of 
trades 
1,919 2,491 801 171 1,519  4,410
% total  43.51% 56.49%  18.16% 3.88% 34.44% 100.00%
Volume 2,726 1,755  146 405 1,204  4,481
% total  60.83% 39.17%  3.25% 9.04% 26.87% 100.00%
Average 
size 
1.42 0.70 0.18 2.37 0.79 
Median 
size 
1.00 0.08 0.05 0.76 0.08 
St. dev.  1.42 3.50  0.74 4.92 4.08 
Min. 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.02 0.0 
Max. 16.42 76.43  7.29 41.68 76.43 
 
B   Spot  trades  only 





business  Total 
No. of 
trades 
1,805 1,703 545 111 1,047  3,508
% total  51.45% 48.55%  15.54% 3.16% 29.85% 100.00%
Volume 2,639 767  70 179 518  3,406
% total  77.49% 22.51%  2.04% 5.25% 15.22% 100.00%
Average 
size 
1.46 0.45 0.13 1.61 0.49 
Median 
size 
1.00 0.06 0.05 0.43 0.07 
St. dev.  1.43 2.80  0.49 4.40 3.22 
Min. 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.02 0.00 
Max. 16.42 76.32  7.06 41.68 76.32 
 
The table shows the trading activity of the four different types of counterparties over the sample pe-
riod, i.e. interbank, preferred commercial, financial and commercial business respectively. All volume 
and trade size statistics are in EUR millions. Panel A contains spot as well as outright forward trades, 
whereas Panel B contains spot trades only. 
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Table 3  Descriptive statistics on regression variables (adjusted data set) 
A  Spot and outright forward trades 
  ∆pit Abs(∆pit)  Qjt Abs(Qjt) Iit Abs(Iit)  ∆t 
 Mean  -0.05  10.71 0.02 1.17 -0.90  3.39  12:56
 Median  0.00  6.00 0.05 0.58 -0.60  2.08  3:47
 Maximum  99.70  99.70 76.43 76.43 73.12  73.12  3:47:49
 Minimum  -91.00  0.00 -76.32 0.00 -49.10  0.00  00:00
 Std. Dev.  17.30  13.58 3.28 3.07 5.77  4.76  20:31
 Observations  3449  3449 3535 3535 3535  33535  3449
B Spot  trades  only 
  ∆pit Abs(∆pit)  Qjt Abs(Qjt) Iit Abs(Iit)  ∆t 
 Mean  -0.09  10.95 -0.06 1.09 -0.85  3.21  15:44
 Median  0.00  7.00 0.05 1.00 -0.53  1.92  5:55
 Maximum  91.00  91.00 16.46 76.32 73.12  73.12  3:47:49
 Minimum  -91.00  0.00 -76.32 0.00 -49.10  0.00  00:00
 Std. Dev.  17.19  13.25 2.64 2.41 5.76  4.85  23:02
 Observations  2808  2808 2895 2895 2895  2895  2808
 
∆pit is the change in price between two successive trades in pips. Abs(∆pit) is the absolute value of this 
change. Qjt is the quantity transacted in millions of EUR from the perspective of the dealer’s counter-
party, positive for a purchase and negative for a sale. Abs(Qjt) is the absolute value of Qjt. Iit is the in-
ventory at the end of period t and Abs(Iit) its absolute value. ∆t is intertransaction time between two 
successive trades. Panel A contains spot as well as outright forward trades, whereas Panel B only 
shows spot trades. 
 
Table 4  Lyons' baseline model 
A    Overall sample (spot and for- 
   ward  trades) 
B  Incoming interbank trades (spot 
 trades  only) 
Dependent Variable: ∆pit 
Included observations: 3449 
Variable Coefficient  t-
Statistic
Constant ***-0.703  -3.53
Order flow Qjt 0.387  0.55










D-W stat  2.47   
Dependent Variable: ∆pit 





Constant ***-2.661  -5.45
Order flow Qjt 0.519  1.51










D-W stat  2.12   
 
The dependent variable is ∆pit, the change in price between two successive trades. In Panel B we use 
incoming interbank spot trades only. Qjt is order flow measured in millions, positive for a purchase by 
another dealer or customer, and negative for a sale. Iit is inventory at the end of period t. Dt is an indi-
cator variable picking up the direction of the trade, positive for purchases (at the ask) and negative for 
sales (at the bid). Estimation uses GMM and Newey-West correction. t-values in the third column, and 
"***", "**" and "*" indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level respectively. 
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Table 5  Inventory management: mean reversion in dealer’s EUR/USD inventory, 
results for Iit – Iit-1 = α + βIit-1 + εt 
 
A  Interbank trades  B  Incoming interbank trades 
β  -0.21
Test statistic  ***(-10.51)
Implied half-life (mean)  47:58
Implied half-life (median)  14:02
Observation 1875  
β  -0.27
Test statistic  ***(-9.26)
Implied half-life (mean)  37:32
Implied half-life (median)  10:59
Observation 1268  
  
C Commercial  business  D Financial  business 
β  -0.35
Test statistic  ***(-7.82)
Implied half-life (mean)  29:50
Implied half-life (median)  8:44
Observation 1491  
β  -0.47
Test statistic  ***(-4.39)
Implied half-life (mean)  23:27
Implied half-life (median)  6:52
Observation 170  
 
The dependent variable is the change in dealer’s inventory between two successive (incoming) inter-
bank, commercial or financial customer trades, respectively. The explanatory variable is lagged inven-
tory. The first row reports the mean reversion coefficient β. The second row shows the test statistic 
from an Augumented Dickey-Fuller unit root test. "***" indicate that the null hypothesis of a unit root is 
rejected at a 1%-significance level. The implied half-life is calculated as mean or median intertransac-
tion time multiplied with ln(2)/ln(1+β) (see Lyons 1998, p.109). The regression contains spot and out-
right forward trades. Results for β and the significance remain stable when we use spot trades only. 
 
 
Table 6  Probit-regression of choice of incoming/outgoing trade 
Dependent Variable: Trade-choice 










Probit regression of incoming/outgoing interbank trade decision. Incoming trades are coded 0, while 
outgoing trades are coded 1. The dummy "Forgoing customer trade" equals 1 if previous trade was 
with a customer. R




Table 7  Tests of cointegration between cumulative customer order flow and inter-
bank order flow  






Constant 44.40 33.06 13.16
Cumulative flow (cum Qjt) 0.08 -0.50 0.56
Trend -0.00 0.01 -0.02
ADF-test ***(-3.00) ***(-3.32) ***(-3.97)
PP-test ***(-2.94) ***(-3.49) ***(-4.59)
Observations 3535 2929 2269
 
The parameters are estimated using ordinary least squares. Since the null hypotheses of a unit root 
are not rejected when testing for the variables, t-values for each coefficient are not reported here. The 
dependent variable is interbank order flow, incoming or outgoing respectively. Cumulative order flow is 
created using the direction and size of all executed trades, incoming and outgoing respectively. ADF-
test is a standard augmented Dickey-Fuller test on the regression residuals. PP-test is a Phillips-
Perron test on the regression residuals. The tests do not include a constant since a constant is in-
cluded in the original regression equation. So "***", "**" and "*" indicate significance of the whole 
model at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
 
 





















Plots show the evolution of cumulative customer order flow and cumulative (outgoing) interbank order 
flow measured in EUR millions.  32
Table 8  Microstructure effects in FX trading: Information effect 
A    Overall sample (spot and for-
ward     trades) 
B  Incoming interbank trades (spot 
 trades    only) 
Dependent Variable: ∆pit 
Included observations: 3449 
Variable Coefficient  t-
Statistic
Constant ***-0.608  -3.14
Order flow Qjt ***-0.380  -4.03






D-W stat  2.47   
Dependent Variable: ∆pit 
Included observations: 1087 
Variable Coefficient  t-
Statistic
Constant ***-2.603  -5.58
Order flow Qjt *0.577  1.69






D-W stat  2.12   
 
The dependent variable is ∆pit, the change in price between two successive trades. In Panel B we use 
incoming interbank spot trades only. Qjt is order flow measured in millions, positive for a purchase by 
another dealer or customer, and negative for a sale. Dt is an indicator variable picking up the direction 
of the trade, positive for purchases (at the ask) and negative for sales (at the bid). Estimation uses 
GMM and Newey-West correction. t-values in the third column, and "***", "**" and "*" indicate signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level respectively. 
 
 
Table 9  Microstructure effects in FX trading: Interbank vs. customer trades 
A Interbank-Dummy  B Customer-Dummies 
Dependent Variable: ∆pit 
Included observations: 3449 
Variable Coefficient t-
Statistic
Constant **0.719  2.33
Order flow Qjt ***-0.364 -4.04
Interbank ***-2.612  -5.05






D-W stat  2.46   
Dependent Variable: ∆pit 
Included observations: 3449 
Variable Coefficient  t-
Statistic
Constant ***-1.889  -5.64
Order flow Qjt ***-0.362  -4.09
Commercial ***2.949  5.52
Financial -1.097  -0.82






D-W stat  2.45   
 
The dependent variable is ∆pit, the change in price between two successive trades. Qjt is order flow 
measured in millions, positive for a purchase from another dealer or customer, and negative for a sale. 
In Panel A the dummy-variable "Interbank" equals 1 if the counterparty is another dealer, 0 otherwise. 
In Panel B the dummy-variable "Commercial" equals 1 if the counterparty is a commercial customer, 0 
otherwise. The dummy-variable "Financial" equals 1 if the counterparty is a financial customer, 0 oth-
erwise. Dt is an indicator variable picking up the direction of the trade, positive for purchases (at the 
ask) and negative for sales (at the bid). Estimation uses GMM and Newey-West correction. t-values in 
the third column, and "***", "**" and "*" indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level respectively. 
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Table 10  Test of cointegration between price and cumulative order flows 
 
The parameters are estimated using ordinary least squares. Since the null hypotheses of a unit root 
are not rejected when testing for the variables, t-values for each coefficient are not reported here, be-
cause they are unreliable as they depend on the sample’s size. The dependent variable is price, the 
exchange rate respectively. Cumulative order flows are created using the direction and size of all exe-
cuted trades, incoming and outgoing respectively. ADF-test is a standard augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test on the regression residuals. PP-test is a Phillips-Perron test on the regression residuals. The tests 
do not include a constant since a constant is included in the original regression equation. So "***", "**" 
and "*" indicate significance of the whole model at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The flow 









































































































Plots show the evolution of price movements and cumulative order flows for different counterparties, 












Constant 0.884 0.884 0.885 0.871  0.891
Cumulative flow 
(cum Qjt) 
-0.291 0.152 -0.029 0.417 -0.438
Trend 0.008 0.167 0.017 0.010  0.001
ADF-test ***(-3.02) **(-2.31) *(-1.78) **(-2.40)  ***(-2.88)
PP-test ***(-3.77) **(-2.45) **(-2.14) ***(-2.67)  ***(-3.11)
Observations 1492 171 1876 1269  606 34
Figure 5  Economies of scale in FX trading: Transaction size, real and estimated 











0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 0

















































Plot shows the relationship between the absolute values of customer orders Qjt measured in EUR mil-
lions and the absolute values of change in price between two successive trades ∆pit (grey). The black 
dotted line is generated by a regression where we take the log of the absolute values of Qjt plus the 
absolute value itself as explanatory variables. 
 
 
Table 11  Microstructure effects in FX trading: Different baseline spreads in inter-
bank, commercial and financial customer trades 
Dependent Variable: ∆pit 
Included observations: 3449 
Variable Coefficient  t-Statistic
Constant **-0.430  -2.24
Order Flow Qjt ***-0.313  -4.03
Commercial direction Dt ***12.751  25.30
Lagged commercial direction Dt-1 ***-12.210  -23.94
Financial direction Dt ***5.872  4.45
Lagged financial direction Dt-1 ***-3.885  -3.71
Interbank direction Dt ***2.595  6.27
Lagged interbank direction Dt-1 -0.595  -1.57
Adjusted R
2 0.26 
D-W stat  2.41 
 
The dependent variable is ∆pit, the change in price between two successive trades. Qjt is order flow 
measured in millions. Dt is an indicator variable picking up the direction of the trade, positive for pur-
chases (at the ask) and negative for sales (at the bid) multiplied with a dummy variable for each coun-
terparty group, i.e. other dealers, commercial or financial customers respectively. Estimation uses 
GMM and Newey-West correction. t-values in the third column, and "***", "**" and "*" indicate signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level respectively.  35
Table 12   Earnings in daily FX trading: Trading volumes and average inventory 
position 
Dependent Variable: Daily trading profit in EUR 





Constant 1,713.83 0.79  1,713.83
Interbank trading volume in EUR  *0.00017 1.68  0.19156
Financial customer trading volume in EUR  ***0.00035 3.91  0.24075
Commercial customer trading volume in EUR  **0.00021 2.48  0.34009
Residuals of "absolute value of average daily 




D-W stat  2.07
 
The dependent variable is daily trading profit in EUR calculated from the overall purchases and sells of 
USD/EUR each day. We average out daily buy and sell rates weighted by the volume of each trade 
and the according exchange rate. Trading volume is the absolute value of daily amounts of EUR sold 
and purchased, separated for individual trading groups such as interbank, financial and commercial 
customers respectively. The absolute value of average daily inventory is the average EUR position 
during each trading day. To extract the partial correlation between trading volume and average inven-
tory position, we here use the residuals of an OLS-estimation regressing trading volume on absolute 
value of average daily inventory. Estimation uses OLS and Newey-West correction for heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation. t-values are reported in the third columns, "***", "**" and "*" indicate signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level respectively. Standardized β-coefficients report the influence of 
the exogenous variables independent of their dimensions. 
 
 
Table 13  Development of the direction variables (spread) over time 
Dependent Variable: 
∆pit 














-0.17 0.07 -0.10 -0.11 -0.14  *-0.37
Order Flow Qjt ***-
0.38 
-0.06 *-0.19 **-0.23 ***-
0.21 
***-0.23 ***-0.32
Direction Dt  ***6.43  ***4.61 ***4.89 ***4.95 ***5.25 ***5.46 ***6.33











Baseline spread 2x |Dt-
1| 
10.02  8.24 8.73 8.89 9.14 9.37 9.42
Share of overall base-
line  spread  100%  82% 87% 89% 91% 93% 94%
Adjusted R
2  0.12  0.11 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.13
Included  observations 3449  1081 1421 1617 1854 2249 3153
The dependent variable is ∆pit, the change in price between two successive trades. Qjt is order flow 
measured in millions. Dt is an indicator variable picking up the direction of the trade, positive for pur-
chases (at the ask) and negative for sales (at the bid). Estimation uses GMM and Newey-West correc-
tion. "***", "**" and "*" indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%-level respectively. 
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Table   14  Estimated income and profits in FX trading   
A    Incomes from different counterparties and proprietary trading 
EURO Income % Income/Day Income/Trade Income/Volume Volume
Total 966,289.62 100.0% 11,106.78 273.35 0.023% 4,138,353,779
Proprietary 173,932.13 18.0% 1,999.22 49.20 0.004% 4,138,353,779
Interbank 21,805.96 2.3% 250.64 11.62 0.001% 2,552,087,693
Financial 72,423.54 7.5% 832.45 423.53 0.018% 405,290,330
Commercial 698,127.98 72.2% 8,024.46 467.91 0.059% 1,180,975,756  
B    Profits from different sources 
EURO Profit % Profit/Day Profit/Trade Profit/Volume Volume
Total 612,389.62 100.0% 7,038.96 173.24 0.015% 4,138,353,779
Interbank/Proprietary 61,763.84 10.1% 709.93 48.66 0.001% 4,138,353,779
Financial 47,104.72 7.7% 541.43 178.43 0.012% 405,290,330
Commercial 503,521.05 82.2% 5,787.60 251.03 0.043% 1,180,975,756  
 
Total income has been calculated on a daily basis: For every day we average out a buy and a sell rate 
(amount of EUR/amount of USD) for all trades weighted by the volume of each trade, e.g. "daily volume 
of USD sold in EUR" divided by "daily volume of USD sold" = average daily exchange rate at the bid. 
Then we approach the income due to the trading activity within each counterparty group and the in-
come that stems from proprietary trading. The share of proprietary trading income is estimated by the 
gap between the overall baseline-spread and the overall spread within an intertransaction time of less 
than 1 minute (see Table 13). We estimate spreads and generated trading income for each single trade 
and for each single counterparty group by using the regression in Table 11. The estimated income 
shares for each trading group are then attached to the total income minus proprietary income. For an 
approximation of profits we assume average transaction costs of EUR 100 per trade. Interbank trading 
income is broken down as follows: Costs are split between commercial and financial customer trades 
depending on the average offsetting activity within each group, the share of offsetting interbank trades 
and the number of trades itself, i.e. costs of commercial business = (1,492 commercial business trades 
+ 34% interbank offsetting trades)*EUR 100 and costs of financial business = (171 financial business 
trades + 64% interbank offsetting trades)*EUR 100. Remaining interbank trades are assumed to be 
proprietary based (costs of proprietary trading = 1,269*EUR 100). 
 